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We analyse top management public sector pay using a panel data of university Vice 
Chancellors (VC) in UK.  We assess how institutional performance, hierarchical effects, and 
personal characteristics determine VC pay. VC personal data covers personal details, 
qualifications and career history, which let us distinguish between internal promotions and 
hires from outside academia.  We use the results of three Research Assessment Exercises as 
academic performance indicators, and university financial positions as measures of sound 
executive management.  We analysed the importance of university salary structure and how 
they affect VC pay.  Fixed and random institutional effects are also identified and analysed. 
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1. Introduction 
 
The large literature on CEO pay is mainly motivated by agency theory.  Theoretical research 
in this area has focused on the measurement of managerial effort, and the alignment of CEOs’ 
incentives with shareholders’ welfare.  The empirical literature has examined whether CEO 
pay is dependent on financial performance and characteristics of the firms.  However, much 
of this research studies top management salaries in the private sector.  Research on the 
remuneration of public sector CEOs is rather scarce
4. This empirical study on Vice-
Chancellor (VC) pay in UK universities contributes to the literature in two ways.
5  At the 
simplest level this paper studies the effects of personal and institutional characteristics on the 
remuneration of UK universities VCs using a unique panel of recent data. At the more subtle 
level this paper extends the empirical study of CEO pay to public sector, and assesses whether 
there is any evidence of performance enhanced pay and tournament effects. 
 
Ideally, to study executive pay in the public sector, we need information on both individual 
pay and the performance of the organisation. Seldom is individual pay information disclosed 
and it is relatively rare for public organisations have their performance measured.
6  Our study 
is made possible only because UK universities have been required, since 1994, to disclose the 
pay of their VCs.
7  Furthermore, the academic performance of UK universities have been 
evaluated approximately every 5 years in the Research Assessment Exercise (RAE) and they 
are required to submit their annual accounts to the Higher Education Statistics Agency 
(HESA).   
 
The structure of this paper is as follows.  The next section briefly reviews what economic 
theory has to say about public sector CEO pay.  In section 3 we describe the governing 
structure of UK universities and the administrative arrangements that exist to determine VC 
pay.  Section 4 discusses the measurement of VC performance and describes the data.  The 
                                                 
4  One exception is Baimbridge and Simpson (1996) using a cross-sectional dataset of UK vice chancellor pay. 
With a limited sample size, many of their variables are insignificant. Halsey and Trow (1971) report some 
summary statistics relating to a survey of VCs in 1967 but this data is not published.  Ehrenberg et. al. (2001) 
studied only the pay of private college presidents in US.  There is now a growing literature on performance 
standards in public sector organisations, see Courty and Marschke (1997). 
5 The CEOs of universities and other higher education institutions in the UK are often given other titles like 
Principal, Rector or Director.  We abstract from this titular subtlety by referring to them all as a group as VCs. 
6 In a survey on incentives in public organizations, Burgess, et al (1999) cited 133 papers and only 4 are 
empirical studies using public sector data and none on CEOs in the public sector. 
7 Although UK higher education institutes are required to disclose their VC’s pay starting from 1994, most 
institutes started to report their figures from 1993.   3 
econometric model to be estimated is reviewed. Finally we discuss the empirical results and 
present our conclusions. 
 
2  The Economic Theory of Public Sector CEO Pay Determination. 
UK Higher education institutions have an annual expenditure over £13.5 billion and provided 
services to over 1.85 million students in 2000/1.
8  The men and women who preside over 
these institutes manage very large budgets that affect many people.  It is their job to run 
organisations that educate young people, contribute to human knowledge.  They are charged 
with facilitating the growth of their institution as well as generating money from private 
sources.  Their roles have been analysed and it is suggested that their executive role is not 
dissimilar to that of a CEO in a private company.
9  The VC is the most powerful person in 
university – he is both the chief executive of the Council and the chairman of the Senate in 
older universities. 
 
Economic theory has little to say about the determination of CEO in the public sector 
explicitly, rather the explanation of their pay would draw on: human capital theory, principal 
agent models, tournament theory and theories of public sector organisations and their 
operation.  The education and experience that an individual acquires over their working life 
may have a direct effect on their marginal productivity and effectiveness in a senior 
management role. Human capital theory would suggest that these factors would play a role in 
their pay determination.  There are however many other factors which will influence what a 
VC is paid.   
 
The central question of importance here is: can a public sector organisation observe executive 
effort and performance and is it able and willing to reward it?  In many respects this is the 
classic principal agent problem. Principal-agent models consider situations in which it is 
necessary to motivate an agent to act on behalf of the principal while keeping the principal’s 
best interests in mind.  It is unclear whether this theoretical structure can be applied to analyse 
the governance of universities by VCs.  First, it is not clear who are the principals.  We can 
argue that the Council and Senate are the principals as the VC is expected to report to them on 
the state of affairs in a university.  But since both bodies have the VC as a member, their 
                                                 
8 HESA publications. 
9 See Dolton and Ma (2001) for a summary regarding Fielden and Lockwood (1973), Moodie and Eustance 
(1974) and McKinnon and Statham (1999).   4 
views and visions regarding the running of university are susceptible to the VC’s influence.  
Therefore although the VC is hired to run the university, his role in practice, can be both that 
of an agent and a principal.  Furthermore, university councils are usually chaired by 
laypersons with members composed of senior university members but include prominent 
local, regional, and national figures, whose wellbeing are not affected by the state of the 
universities they help to run. 
 
Tournament theories view workers’ promotions up a hierarchical organisation as competitive.  
Workers are motivated by the two prizes that come with promotion: first, the pay rise which 
accompanies the promotion and second the chance to compete in future competitions.  As one 
goes higher up in the hierarchy, the number of future competitions falls causing the incentive 
to win a promotion race to fall.  Thus the pay rise that comes with promotion must increase to 
compensate for the lost incentive (Lazear and Rosen, 1981).  This generates the pattern seen 
in many large organisations where top management pay is proportionately much higher than 
those that are directly under them.  A corollary to this reasoning means that VCs in 
universities with more highly paid staff, themselves receive disproportionately higher relative 
salaries. As business school professors and clinical academic staff tend to have higher 
salaries, this theory suggested that VCs in business schools or universities with medical 
schools are paid more.  Furthermore, the more competitors there are for the VC post, the 
higher is the VC pay. Thus the number of highly paid academic staff in an institution would 
also exert upward pressure on VC pay. 
 
Quasi-Markets and Publicly Funded Organisations. 
Public sector organisations that are encouraged by the government to compete on desirable 
attributes are said to operate in quasi-markets.  With successive Conservative governments in 
the 1980s the performances of public sector organisations were increasingly placed under 
scrutiny.  The public sector management policy in the last 20 years has been dominated by the 
development of new performance criteria to empower the consumers and create competition 
in the markets.  As a result league tables of the best performing schools, universities and 




                                                 
10  See Glennerster (1991).   5 
Cyert (1975) recognised there are difficulties in assessing universities on their performance in 
teaching and research.  Seeking to apply economic principles and efficient management 
techniques on publicly funded universities, he suggested that the quality of research be 
‘measured by the quality of the journals in which the research is published.’ and judged by 
the times publications were cited.
11   For teaching, he suggested that be measured by 
responses from student questionnaires, and ‘by peer ratings based on syllabi, homework 
assignments, and class visitation’.
12  Clearly the ideas behind the time consuming Research 
Assessment Exercise (RAE) and Qualitative Assurance Assessments (QAA) for judging 
university performance are not new. 
 
Cyert (1975) also suggested that the more criteria an institution is judged by, the better, as 
there would be more measurements and feedbacks, making it harder for executives to “win 
the game” arbitrarily.
13  Yet later research by Holmström and Milgrom (1991) shows that 
multiple criteria, with some targets easier to meet than others, could have detrimental effects 
on the principal’s welfare and augmented measurement costs.  Dixit (1996, 1997) considered 
a similar model where the agent instead of facing multiple tasks, have to deal with being 
evaluated by multiple principals.  This is the situation faced by university CEOs when there is 
‘...no agreement among the trustees, faculty, and students on the criteria for judging the 
performance of the president’
14 
 
A final set of factors which may influence the determination of VC pay relate to the political 
factors governing the allocation of resources in UK higher education. Increasingly quasi-
market indicators have been used to allocate HEFCE funds.  The problem with these quasi-
market indicators are that usually they respond far too slowly.  For example, market forces 
would suggest that student enrolment would react to the performance improvement of a 
university. Unfortunately the university would not recoup the full returns until at least three 
years later when the first wave of students started their third year in higher education.   
Likewise research performance depends highly on an institution’s ability to hire and retain 
outstanding faculty. In addition the RAE is conducted only every 4 or 5 years, which means it 
                                                 
11  See Cyert (1975) , p.9 
12  See Cyert (1975) , p.9. 
13  See Cyert (1975), p.10. 
14 See Cohen and March (1974), p.26.   6 




One major limitation on the operation of UK universities (and potentially the pay of their VC) 
is that they are constrained by how much public funding they are allocated.  Although their 
dependence on state funding has fallen over the last 20 years, most of the research universities 
still get around 40% of their funding from the government block grant.  This figure is as high 
as 70% for the universities created in 1992.  As a large part of this money is earmarked, the 
scope for the initiative of the CEO is curtailed, making it hard to undertake radical change and 
introduce new income generating activities. The public funding formula that generates a 
university’s income will have strong effects on the universities’ finances, yet they are often 
subject to changes resulting from political rather than economical reasons.  These irregular 
changes could distort assessment and judgements over the effectiveness of a VC.     
Furthermore, with the few exceptions of older universities, most universities’ assets and 
properties are provided by public funds.  Without the permission of the Treasury, the 
universities have no rights to sell them or convert them for other uses.
16  At the same time 
these universities are committed to increasing the component of turnover not attributable to 




3  Determination of Pay and Tenure for VCs 
In CEO pay literature the financial performances of the firm is used to measure the 
competency of the CEO.  As public sector firms usually have objectives that differ from those 
in the private sector, it is not clear how we can measure the managerial skills of VCs by 
looking at university’s financial performance.  Besides, universities are increasingly run by a 
team of VCs and Pro-VCs, making it hard to identify the personal contribution of the VC 
towards the university’s performance.
17 It is also hard to judge whether the university has 
performed well as a result of good management or the perpetuation of its accomplished 
reputation. 
 
                                                 
15  Cyert (1975) , p.11. 
16 Our thanks for Paul Hare for enlightening us on the property right issue. 
17 This problem was first studied Holmström (1982).     7 
It is now common for VCs to be appointed on fixed term contracts with the possibility of 
reappointment.  These days VCs are appointed at a much younger age and vice chancellorship 
is no longer a final appointment for prominent academics to round up their impressive career 
before they retire.  Our data indicate that currently the usual term of appointment is 5 to 7 
years. However there are a few VCs in post-1992 universities who were appointed more than 
20 years ago and have remained there ever since. 
 
Eligible candidates for VC jobs are in short supply in UK as well as around the world.
18  This 
competition for a limited pool of talents has driven up VC relative salaries, making long term 
contracts more expensive than ever.  One simple way for a VC to improve their pay is to 
move to another university.  Indeed there has been an increasing trend for VC appointments to 
be individuals who were former VCs at other universities.  It is also possible that the 5 year 
RAE cycle has contributed to shortening the tenure of VC appointments.  VCs often resign in 
the year leading up to next round of results reasoning that this will allow their successor time 
to learn about the organisation, so that they would be prepared to make the necessary changes 
and reorganisation to respond to the upcoming RAE results.  A more cynical view suggested 
that some VCs decided to resign if a bad RAE performance is expected.
19 
 
Salary Components and Review 
The method of setting initial pay and the relative size of the different pay components are 
dependent upon the competency of the candidate, availability of similarly suitable candidates, 
and the pay of the previous incumbent.  Usual pay packages come in the form of salary, 
pension, housing and the use of a company car.  Some VC contracts may have an implicit or 
explicit performance related component but it has become increasingly hard to implement: if 
the VC awards himself with a large pay rise, it becomes difficult to control the pay rise 
expectation of his staff.
20  Such considerations put pressure on search committees to give VCs 
large initial pay, followed by gentle rises in the future. 
 
Some VC has their annual pay rise explicitly linked to the university’s annual performance 
relative to a comparable set of universities.  For example the members of the Russell Group of 
                                                 
18 See Guardian Education, 30th May, 2000, Basinger (2002) and Basinger and Perry (2002) reported that now it 
is common for the salaries of public universities in the States to be paid out of private donations and funds. 
19 See Guardian of May 30, 2000.and the THES of 30
th Jan , 2000, p.11. 
20 The difference between implicit and explicit performance related pay is that the former type of contract need 
not be observed or may be enforced by third parties, while the later does.   8 
universities would compare among themselves on financial indicators, RAE, QAA, research 
contracts, teaching incomes, student recruitment and rankings on newspapers league tables. 
Salary reviews of all senior members of a university, professors and upwards, are considered 
by a university remuneration committee.  Only committee members of grades higher than the 
grades that are being considered would remain to discuss, peers of the considered grade are 
excluded.  When they consider the VC pay, only senior lay members remain. 
 
 
4  Performance Measurement and Data 
 
In this section we describe the data and the performance measurement variables we used
21.  
We will first discuss the institutional characteristics, personal variables, and finally some 
regional controls for costs of living.  All monetary terms are adjusted to 2001 prices.   
 
From 1994, institutions prepare their accounts using a standardised method.
22  These changes 
enable us to compare universities’ financial performances with unprecedented accuracy and 
make these indicators become more important over time.  Our choice of financial 
performance indicators are Grants, funding from the research councils; Fees, total of support 
grants and academic fees; Research and Contracts, total research grants and contracts from 
private sources and charities; Sundry, additional funds generated from the operations of 
accommodation, catering services and etcetera.  These variables are also correlated to 
institutional size. 
 
Layard and Verry (1975) reported evidence of scale economies in running UK universities.  
Oi and Idson (1999) provided an overview on how firm size affects pay.  It was suggested that 
the larger is the firm, and more responsibility is held by the CEO, therefore they are 
remunerated accordingly.  The size measurement variables are number of Undergraduate and 
Postgraduate students, number of Academic Staff, and number of Academic Cost Centres.  
 
Enrolment of overseas students, especially for taught postgraduate degrees, is an important 
source of income for many institutions as well as a mean to elevate their international 
                                                 
21 Detailed list of data sources available from the authors on request. 
22 CVCP (1994).   9 
reputation.  Many British universities have overseas offices that act as information portal, 
administrate entrance exams and resits.  Representatives are sent to education fairs around the 
world and they plan strategies to raise their international profiles.  We expect VC performance 
to be partially evaluated on overseas student enrolments.  We choose three variables that are 
continuously available in HESA publications to measure such effects: Fees Received from 
Non Home-Fees Students, Entrants of Non Home-Fees Postgraduates, Number of Non Home-
Fees Undergraduates. 
 
Higher Education Funding Councils in UK administrate reviews on university teaching and 
research performances.  Each year universities are reviewed on their teaching performances 
on a list of subjects by a QAA panel; this review is not repeated for most subjects.  We 
decided against using this variable as it is insignificant and severely limits our sample size.
23  
RAE is conducted every 4 to 5 years to review the research performance of university 
departments.  Funding Councils use the RAE results to determine the amount of funding 
allocated to university departments.  Departments are rated on a 7-grade scale, with that we 
construct an average RAE score per staff assessed for each university.  Our sample covers the 
RAE carried out in 1992, 1996 and 2001. 
 
Tournament theories predict that the existence of a medical school as well as the number of 
highly paid academic staff give upward pressure to VC salaries.  To measure such effects we 
use the ratio of medical students to all students, ratio of academic staff with annual salary 
more than £50,000 and ratio of academic staff who earns more than £100,000.  The number 
of medical students a university has may indirectly influence VC pay as medical students are 
taught by clinical staff who are better remunerated than the average academics.   
 
The age (Age) of an institution has impact on pay as it correlates to prestige and cumulative 
influence of the university in, and outside, the academic world.  We define age of institutions 
as the number of years passed since (1) an institute became a university through the award of 
a Royal Charter; or (2) becoming a member of a university federation.  Colleges with no 
degree awarding power of their own have age set equal to zero. 
   10 
The institutions are a very diverse group.  They range from civic universities with over 16,000 
undergraduates with courses on a broad variety of subjects, to small colleges specialised in 
vocational trainings for professionals.    Their backgrounds, the markets they cater for, and 
their administration structures are all very different (see Dolton and Makepeace, 1982).  To 
improve the comparability among them, we introduce a group of institutional type dummies: 
Oxbridge for Oxford and Cambridge; Civics for Civic universities; Former CAT for former 
colleges of advanced technology; New for universities established in 1960s; London for 
London University colleges; Business / Technology / Medicine for colleges specialized in 
such subjects; and Former Polytechnics is the reference group that covers polytechnics and 
colleges that were granted university status in early 1990s.  Lastly, a dummy called Russell 
Group is equal to one for a group of research emphasized universities whose heads meet 
regularly in the Russell Hotel to discuss matters of common concern.  Now a powerful lobby 
group, its membership has grown through the years.  Alphabetically they are Birmingham, 
Bristol, Cambridge, Cardiff, Edinburgh, Glasgow, King’s College, Imperial College, Leeds, 
Liverpool, LSE, Manchester, Newcastle, Nottingham, Oxford, Sheffield, Southampton, UCL, 
and Warwick. 
 
Personal Characteristics and VC Career Path 
We collected personal information on VC from Who's Who of VCs, Presidents and Rectors of 
Commonwealth Universities (ACU’s Who’s Who) and Who's Who - An Annual Biographical 
Dictionary.  Together the two provide us with birth year, gender, marital status, and academic 
qualifications.  We also know when they received knighthoods, public honours, fellowships, 
honorary degrees, and their career histories.  Observations with VCs who were not in either 
dictionary are excluded estimations which use personal variables. 
 
Most VCs were academics at the time of appointment, most of them have extensive work 
experiences in academia, or governmental bodies linked to education.  The newer universities 
have appointed a few VCs with nearly no working experience in the education sector but are 
equipped with management skills acquired in the private sector.  Just over half the VCs have 
worked in non-academic jobs and 10% of the VCs have spent more than half of their career in 
such jobs. 
 
                                                                                                                                                          
23 Inclusion of QAA causes us to drop all the observations of an institution until it receives its first QAA report.    11 
Until recently VCs hold their offices until they retire and rarely leave to take up another VC 
appointment.  Nearly half (45.5%) of them were pro-VCs before they were appointed, and 
37.4% were promoted from within the same institution.  For those whose terms were 
completed, an average VC spends 7.65 years in the job, and 6.0 years if we are including 
those who are still in office. 
 
VC salaries were published annually in the Times Higher Education Supplement (THES) since 
1995.  We have 7 or 8 years of observations for most institutions, depending on whether they 
started to disclose the VC pay and benefits in their financial statements from 1993 or 1994.  
The reported figures for benefits are the estimated values of benefits in kind – such as 
university-provided car, medical insurance, subsidised loans and subsidised accommodation – 
but usually exclude pension contributions by employers.  We are aware that there are 
elements of remuneration that are not accounted for in the reported salary figures.  Some VCs 
do not have to pay any tax for the university provided accommodation because their 
universities have long standing tax agreements with their local tax inspectors.  Also, 
arrangements for pension contributions vary across institutions, particularly for VCs 
approaching retirement.  These factors could disguise the real worth of pay packages to VCs 
and the pay comparability across institutions.  Finally, since the living costs differ across the 
country, we expected the VC to be compensated accordingly. Such effects are measured by 
two county level variables: the average price of a semi-detached house and average weekly 
wage. 
 
5.  Econometric Model and Estimation 
In our dataset we observed 104 VC changes.  Therefore ideally we would wish to estimate an 
econometric model for the determination of VC pay which will distinguish between the 
individual’s personal attributes the characteristics of the institutions they work for.  In 
addition we would like the model to be flexible enough to allow for unobserved heterogeneity 
across individuals and institutions and over time.   A general estimation model which captures 
many of the above features is a random effects model with separate heterogeneity terms for 
universities and individuals: 
00 11 00 11
ijt i it j jt kt i j ijt yX X Z Z Wu v ββ δδγ ε = ++++ + + +  
                                                                                                                                                          
Sample size reduces by 37 to 47% depending on the model specification.   12 
where the i subscript is for the individual VC, the j subscript is for the specific institution, k is 
for the region the institution is located, and t relates to the time period. 
 
Both the individuals and universities have time invariant and variant attributes.  Time 
invariant attributes of individual i and institution j are respectively represented by  i X  and  j Z .  
Time variant attributes of are represented by  it X  and  jt Z  where t denotes the time period.  
The natural log of real earnings of VC i at university j at time t is denoted by  ijt y .  The set of 
time varying economic variables for region k are denoted by  tk W .  The stochastic error terms 
that capture unobserved heterogeneity across individuals, universities and over time are 
denoted respectively by  ijt j i v u ε , , .  The parameters we are to estimate are 
01 0 1 , , , and   ββδδ γ . 
 
The model outlined above is of the most general form.  Our first task is to investigate a 
simplified form of this model using OLS estimation without estimating the individual and 
institution specific unobserved heterogeneity.  Then we model the effect of the unobserved 
heterogeneity of institutions with random effects estimation. 
 
6.  Regression Results 
 
We estimated the model using three sets of explanatory variables.  First we used only 
Personal Characteristics, then only Institutional Characteristics, and finally we put the two 
together and estimated a Combined regression.  Personal Characteristics regressions are 
human capital estimations where we measure the personal characteristics of VC on pay.  In 
Institutional Characteristics regressions we estimate the relationship between VC pay and 
institutional performances, hierarchical structure and size.  The Combined is a combination of 
personal and institutional characteristics, principal components created using size variables, 
and regional variables.  University type dummies and a Golden-handshake dummy are used in 
all estimations, where the later equals to one if it is the final observation of an appointment as   13 
bonuses are usually awarded to VC for completing the contract.
24  The results of ordinary 





2 the of Personal Characteristics specification is relatively high, at 0.46 it is higher than 
many of the human capital earning regressions reported in the literature where most fall 
between 0.3 and 0.4.  For the Institutional Characteristics and  Combined, their R
2 are 
respectively 0.73 and 0.75.  Unfortunately, these figures are not strictly comparable as the 
samples of the three estimations differ due to missing observations.  As there are a few 
observations with extremely high salaries, we estimated the equations without observations 
where salaries are out of the 95% bound for comparison.
26  Results show that these high 
salaries observation did not introduce many biases to the regressions.  We observe only some 
marginal changes in significance levels and a few original estimators lie outside the 95% 
confidence intervals of the estimators in the supplementary regressions. 
 
Results of particular importance are that we find that VCs are remunerated for the academic 
performance of a university; we also find that the paid of VCs are higher if there are many 
potential competitors for the post, as predicted by the tournament theory; and VCs are 
remunerated for the amount of responsibility they held. 
 
Personal Details 
All variables except the dummy representing public honours were significant in the Personal 
estimation.  The signs of the significant estimators are as expected with the exception that the 
knighthood-public honour interactive dummy, which lowers instead of increases pay in all 
Personal estimations. It is possible that those VCs well known in public life are either 
receiving a compensating differential by being employed at one of the most prestigious 
institutions or are in line for the receipt of lucrative company directorships and don’t need a 
higher VC salary. 
 
                                                 
24 Such bonuses may include monetary compensation for leaves that the VC had not had the chance to take.  
25 The Fixed Effects results are available from the authors on request. 
26 Supplmentary estimation results available on requests.   14 
Table 1  Effects of Personal and Institutional Characteristics on VC Pay 
  Personal Characteristics  lnstitutional Characteristics  Combined 
Constant 
Golden Handshake 











11.16704    





Gender .0428636        (.021655)  **        .0656362      (.024815) *** 
VC’s Age  .0064436     (.001408) ***        .0033885        (.001865) * 
Current Marital Status  .037924     (.020150)  **        .0366431     (.024686)  
Knighthood .0796841        (.019542) ***        .0373386        (.025738)  
Public Honours  -.0304475     (.059998)        -.0931009        (.054598) * 
Have Both Knighthood and Public Honours  -.2089489     (.113062) *        .1237425        (.139688)  
VC’s Training and Experience              
Law -.0245676        (.031078)        .0313391        (.046927)  
Engineer  .0463117      (.021972) **        -.0297251        (.026560)  
Science .0270187        (.017586) ***        .0111267        (.020636)  
Social Science  .0645142      (.017645) ***        -.0242043        (.020070)  
Business .1417668        (.033054) ***        -.0308784     (.040043)  
Non-Academic .0880667        (.021601) ***        .0546178        (.025014) ** 
Batchelor Degrees  .0451126     (.013289) ***        .0210196        (.021309)  
Master Degrees  .0282397     (.009855)  ***        .0295365      (.013125) ** 
Doctoral Degrees  -.0108153     (.008625)        .0072679        (.012145)  
Other Degrees and Certificates  .0452102     (.009769) ***        .0348143        (.012784) *** 
Fellowships, Memberships, and Honorary Degrees  .0060946     (.001885) ***        -.0009663     (.002284)  
Tenure .0046107        (.003769)        -.0036616        (.005542)  
Tenure2 -.000393        (.000265)        .0005456        (.000399)  
Oxbridge .0178001        (.011286)        -.0275993        (.015129) * 
Non Academic Job Experience  .008847     (.011563)          .0444746     (.014943) *** 
Internally Promoted  .0025789     (.013607)        .0501454        (.017718) *** 
Ex Pro-VC  .0181085     (.013783)        -.0496916        (.018122) *** 
Ex VC  .0559032     (.017774) ***        -.0143271     (.026113)  
Professorship .0220788        (.014520)        .0303322        (.019470)  
Institutional Characteristics (Lagged 1 Year)              
Ln (Grants)                      (£ in 2000 prices)        2.67e-09     (1.29e-9) **       
Ln (Fees)                         (£ in 2000 prices)        4.40e-09     (1.56e-9) ***       
Ln (Research Contracts)  (£ in 2000 prices)        -1.86e-09     (1.14e-9)        
Ln (Sundry Fund)            (£ in 2000 prices)        -1.43e-09     (1.16e-9)        
Number of Academic Cost Centres        .007846     (.001504)  ***       
Undergraduates       -2.28e-06        (4.82e-6)        
Postgraduates       1.23e-06        (.000010)        
Staff       -5.62e-06        (.000011)        
RAE Results        .0190191     (.007824) ** .0125292        (.008456)  
Ratio of Medical Students        .2951039     (.087039) *** .1604057        (.078673) ** 
Ratio of Academic Staff with an annual salary of £50k or above        .9692457      (.164184)  ***  .897573     (.150667)  *** 
Ratio of Academic Staff with an annual salary of £100k or above        .8657148     (.350433) ** 1.280331        (.324482) *** 
University’s Age        .0001542     (.000088)  *  .0001555      (.000082) * 
Regional Statistics (Lagged 1 Year)              
Average Weekly Wage (2000 prices)              .000095     (.000099)   
Average Price of a Semi-Detached House (2000 prices)              3.54e-07     (2.41e-7)  
Principal Components (Lagged 1 Year)                
Factor  1  (Financial)           .1268301        (.018149) *** 
Factor 2 (Size of Undergraduate body)              .030542     (.011548)  *** 
Factor  3           -.0650502        (.013263) *** 
Factor  1  Squared              
Factor  2  Squared              
Factor 3 Squared              -.0650502     (.013263) *** 
Overseas Students 
            
Fees received from Non Home Fees Students        -6.33e-06     (4.92e-6)  -4.06e-06  (4.36e-6)  
Entrants of Non Home Fees Postgraduates        .0000507     (.000050)  .0000814        (.000045) * 
Number of Non Home Fees Undergraduates        -2.93e-06     (.000047)  -.0000679        (.000043)  
University Types              
Russell 19  .146913     (.019025)  ***  .0487259     (.042320)  .0400484        (.036151)  
OxBridge -.3217496        (.050456) *** -.3317906        (.109846) *** -.4899861        (.103056) *** 
Civic -.0649266        (.018958) *** -.0740547        (.028856) ** -.062737        (.027184) ** 
Former CAT  .0458363     (.023166) ** .0497445        (.030618) * .0375518        (.030997)  
New -.0970651     (.02308) ***  -.0363055        (.034334)  -.0566404        (.032769) * 
Business / Technology / Medicine  .1425671     (.025487) *** .0769948        (.053392)    .0472743      (.049137)  
Arts and Performing Arts  -.2776672     (.027866) *** -.1378244        (.034743) *** -.1663925     (.049389) *** 
London University’s Colleges  -.1315722     (.021761) *** .0223982        (.034711)  -.0735234        (.034858) ** 
Others (e.g. College of Guidance Studies)  -.2059438     (.025227) *** -.1482024        (.023440) *** -.1089657        (.032926) *** 












Asterisks specify the significance level of the estimated coefficients, * is 10%, ** is 5%, and *** is 1%.   15 
Table 2  VC Pay Estimation with Random Institutional Effects 
  Personal Characteristics  lnstitutional Characteristics  Combined 
Constant 
Golden Handshake 
VC’s Personal Details 
11.34827    
.0109002    
(.0935995) 
(.0132227) 
*** 11.31207       





11.08466    





Gender -.0367968        (.0299698)         .0693807        (.039379) * 
VC’s Age  .005074     (.0016585)  ***        .0049434     (.002665) * 
Current Marital Status  -.0326259     (.0242989)         .0540255        (.033664)  
Knighthood .0092645        (.0194163)         .0099357        (.032447)  
Honours .0368796        (.0595846)         -.0316296        (.061504)  
Have Both Knighthood and Honour  -.2227898     (.0973283) **        .0088534        (.111943)  
VC’s Training and Experience                 
Law -.0488606        (.0362362)         .0678904        (.076271)  
Engineer  .016657     (.0267597)          -.0439509     (.038272)  
Science -.005065        (.0230277)         .0004846        (.029285)  
Social Science  -.0090495     (.0213474)         -.0178098        (.029021)  
Business .1014387        (.0539004) *       -.0261795        (.060180)  
Non-Academic .0761911        (.0232961)  ***        .0422492      (.034556)  
Batchelor Degrees  .0209523     (.0168742)         .0204418        (.029812)  
Master Degrees  .0119983      (.012456)         .0280026        (.018199)  
Doctoral Degrees  -.0255239     (.0101525) ***        .0197844        (.017140)  
Other Degrees and Certificates  .0082108     (.0121684)         .0308328        (.015073) ** 
Fellowships, Memberships, and Honorary Degrees  .007014     (.0020908)  ***        -.0011464     (.002771)  
Tenure -.0010981        (.0033671) **       -.0218416        (.005883) *** 
Tenure
2 .0005618        (.0002396)         .0016619        (.000434) *** 
Oxbridge .0118916        (.0147989)         -.0397671        (.021254) * 
Non Academic Job Experience  -.0136314     (.0143275)         .0497036        (.021448) ** 
Internally Promoted  -.0187675     (.0189609)         .0436809        (.025093) * 
Ex Pro-VC  .0234796     (.0165997)         -.0605997        (.025487) ** 
Ex VC  .0234826     (.0224161)         -.0463378        (.038147)  
Professorship .0201372        (.0170102)          .0103867      (.027111)  
Institutional Characteristics (Lagged 1 Year)                 
Ln (Grants)                      (£ in 2000 prices)        3.17e-09     (1.51e-9) **       
Ln (Fees)                         (£ in 2000 prices)        3.90e-09     (1.91e-9) **       
Ln (Research Contracts)  (£ in 2000 prices)        -2.42e-09     (1.50e-9)        
Ln (Sundry Fund)            (£ in 2000 prices)        1.94e-10     (1.45e-9)        
Number of Academic Cost Centres        .0067496     (.001716) ***       
Undergraduates       -7.26e-07        (5.80e-6)        
Postgraduates       -5.66e-06        (.000011)        
Staff       -3.70e-06        (8.40e-6)        
RAE Results        .027785     (.007041)  ***  .0270033     (.007994) *** 
Ratio of Medical Students        .2966463     (.127301) ** .1316125        (.119574)  
Ratio of Academic Staff with an annual salary of £50k or above        .744708     (.150916)  ***  .7309793     (.148064) *** 
Ratio of Academic Staff with an annual salary of £100k or above        1.063498     (.312992) *** 1.121992        (.287540) *** 
University’s Age        .0001036     (.000134)    .000136     (.000131)   
Regional Statistics (Lagged 1 Year)                 
Average Weekly Wage (2000 prices)              .0000185     (.000078)  
Average Price of a Semi-Detached House                                   
(2000 prices) 
           1.02e-06      (2.98e-7)  *** 
Principal Components (Lagged 1 Year)                 
Factor 1 (Financial)              .1447848     (.027878) *** 
Factor 2 (Size of Undergraduate body)              .0233624     (.017525)  
Factor 3              -.0433994     (.013553) *** 
Overseas Students                 
Fees received from Non Home Fees Students        -8.30e-07    (4.91e-6)    -1.77e-06     (4.40e-6)  
Entrants of Non Home Fees Postgraduates        .0000127     (.000061)  -8.21e-06        (.000055)  
Number of Non Home Fees Undergraduates        -.0000731     (.000051)  -.0000791        (.000051) * 
University Types 
               
Russell 19  .1638834     (.0417574) ***  .0287701        (.062242)  .0715768        (.055836)  
OxBridge -.2327085        (.1100898) **  -.2968314        (.164774) * -.4459123        (.158129) *** 
Civic -.0341213        (.0399122)   -.0748123        (.042061)  *  -.071218      (.041712) * 
Former CAT  .0857759     (.0474951) *  .0437048        (.044987)  .0117346        (.047570)  
New -.0425531        (.0513281)   -.0395325        (.049780)  -.0639566        (.049281)  
Business / Technology / Medicine  .2015011     (.0479001) ***  .0805973        (.076596)  .0315863        (.072421)  
Arts and Performing Arts  -.3071065     (.0519966) ***  -.1401125        (.049780) *** -.2203684        (.071549) *** 
London University’s Colleges  -.0771141     (.0437565) *  .0187146        (.049983)  -.1403243        (.050728) *** 
Others (e.g. College of Guidance Studies)  -.2233728     (.0503275) ***  -.1530284        (.034698) *** -.0988479        (.051085) * 
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Sigma u  .12641261  .10396861  .08753796 
Sigma e  .10623817  .08368987  .06699066 
Rho (fraction of variance due to u_i)  .58606838  .60681466  .63065751 
Number of Observations 



















1 The Combined regression has all the Personal Characteristics, Institutional Characteristics minus the eight size variables, the three Principal 
Components, Regional Statistics, and the University Type dummies.  Asterisks specify the significance level of the estimated coefficients, * 
is significant at 10%, ** is at 5%, and *** is at 1%. 
 
 
The estimates for gender effect are positive and significant in the two OLS and the Combined 
RE estimations, showing that men earns more (gender  = 1 for men).  Interestingly, we 
estimated the same equations using only pre-92 universities in our sample and found a 
negative and significant estimator for gender in the FE and RE Personal estimations but 
insignificant in Combined.  This estimator shows the effect of salary changes within the same 
institution when the gender of a new VC appointment changes.  Lazear and Rosen (1990) 
hypothesised that because females on average have better non-labour market opportunities 
than man, thus among those who participate in the labour market, the females would on 
average have higher ability than males.  As a result, the gender wage gap would close up as 
the ability level demanded of the workers increases.  The different results generated from the 
two samples may suggest that the set of skills required for governing the pre-92 universities 
are relatively scarce. 
 
VC’s Training and Experience 
The human capital of VCs are measured by a set of academic background subject dummy 
variables showing the academic training they received with Arts and Humanities as the 
reference group.  There is a Non-Academic dummy for VCs who have spent more than half of 
their career outside academia or had never worked in academia.  We measure the amount of 
academic training they received by the numbers of bachelor degrees, master degrees and other 
degrees they have.  All the degree variables have positive and significant estimated 
coefficients in the Personal estimation.  The estimator for doctoral degrees, however, is 
insignificant and negative in Personal OLS estimation but significant and negative in the 
Personal RE estimations.   
   17 
Results of the OLS estimations show no significant relationship between income and tenure.   
In the RE estimations, the estimators of tenure and tenure
2 are both significant in only the 
Combined estimations.  Together the signs on the tenure and tenure
2 terms indicate a U-
shaped relationship of pay with time in the job.  Since on average VCs stay in their jobs for 
7.65 years, this rise could be driven by the bonus one gets for completing a contract.  In 
addition, the available supply of potential VCs is very limited, thus driving up VC starting 
salaries.  However, it may be politically unwise for VCs to accept large pay rises amid tenure 
when those offered to their staff are relatively modest. These factors make it difficult to award 
pay rise to incumbent VCs that are in line with the market rates, forcing the institutes to offer 
increasingly large initial salaries and small pay rises to VCs. 
 
These observations contradict human capital theory, that is, pay is concavely related to tenure.  
In the context of a VC appointment the theory suggests that a VC would rapidly acquire 
human capital specific to the job in the early years, but marginal increases in such investment 
become more costly as the stock of human capital grows larger.  Typically the returns from 
acquiring further connections and committee positions, and the specific skills of high-level 
networking may be less obvious after the first few years in the post. 
 
The career histories of VCs are represented by a set of dummy variables and we highlight the 
results of variables relating to non-academic job experience, internally promoted, and ex-VC.  
VCs with Non-academic Job Experience are paid significantly more according to the FE and 
RE Combined estimations.  This positive effect on pay is possibly caused by the constant 
pressure put upon universities to be more business-like in the last 25 years, making 
managerial experience acquired out of academia very valuable.  Internally Promoted is 
positive and significant in the OLS and RE Combined estimations, showing that internally 
promoted VCs are paid more than those externally hired.  This contradicts Chan (1996), a 
paper that extended tournament theory to describe internal versus external recruitment, shows 
that workers recruited externally are usually significantly superior to the internal candidates 
and would be paid more than internally promoted workers.  It is possibly due to workers are 
concerned about the reputation of the institutions they work for, as it gives strong signal about 
their stock of human capital, as well as pay.  Some might be willing to accept lower pay for a   18 
post at an institution with better reputation.  With the prestige factor at work, the relationship 
between pay and external recruitment becomes less clear. 
 
Our variable, Ex-VC equals to one if the VC had worked as a VC elsewhere.  Only a quarter 
of the institutions in our sample had appointed such candidates, which is possibly why Ex-VC 
is significant only in the Personal OLS estimation.  A study on VC characteristics by 
Catherine Bargh et al. (2000) reported that only a few VCs moved from the post-1992 
universities to the older universities, but none moved in the other direction. 
 
Institutional and Regional characteristics 
Eight of the institutional characteristics variables are correlated with institutional size.  They 
are the four financial variables: Grants, Fees, Research Contracts and Sundry Funds; and the 
number of Academic Cost Centres,  Undergraduates,  Postgraduates, and Academic Staff.  
They are also correlated to the reputation of the institution.  For example, the covariance 
between the number of postgraduate students and research contract size is 0.75.  Institutions 
with wider research portfolios can offer a broader variety of postgraduate degrees.  On the 
other hand, students are attracted by the reputation of the institution and being taught by 
researchers who are leaders in their fields. 
 
The Institutional OLS regression has a very high R
2 despite the fact that many of the size 
variables are insignificant, a sign that the model is affected by multicollinearity.  We therefore 
replace the size variables with the first three loadings of principal components derived from 
them in the Combined regressions.
27  In the OLS estimation we find evidence that the size of 
university affect VC pay: estimators of the first and second loadings are positive and 
significant at 1%, estimator of the third loading is negatively significant at the 1% level.  For 
the RE estimation the first loading is positively significant and third loading is negatively 
significant, both at the 1% level.  This shows that the size of the institution has a direct effect 
on the VCs remuneration.  In addition the variable related to the diversity of the institution as 
measured by the number of Academic Cost Centres suggests that there is some compensating 
differential for the complexity of the job. 
                                                 
27 A table showing the composition of the principal components can be found in the Appendix.   19 
 
Institutional type and the Russell 19 dummies show that Oxbridge and Civic universities pay 
significantly lower salaries to their VCs than the reference group, the former polytechnics. 
This result might seem counter-intuitive as one might guess that the VCs at Oxbridge and 
Civic universities, with greater responsibility since they run larger and more prestigious 
universities would be paid more.  One explanation of the negative effect observed on the 
Oxbridge and Civic university type dummies is that it might be attributable to the difference 
between housing benefits offered to the VCs by the old and new universities.  Older 
universities also usually have special arrangements with the local tax offices so that their VCs 
pay no tax on university provided accommodation; whereas VCs of new universities often do 
not usually enjoy this privilege.  In addition, the VC at the more prestigious university might 
be able to look forward to more lucrative company directorships and other honorary posts 
with sizeable stipends after leaving their university job. 
 
Results of the RE estimations show that VCs are not rewarded for larger overseas student 
recruitment – the number of non home-fees postgraduate entrants and non home-fees 
undergraduates decrease pay.  What we observe here could be driven by institutions with 
financial difficulties seeking to turn the tide by expanding their overseas student intake, which 
is why the VC pay is negatively correlated with the number of overseas students.  We have 
also considered whether it is the year on year changes of these values relative to the average 
in the industry that really mattered.  As the recruitment of overseas students is highly 
dependent on the performance of the world economy, one can see this as a benchmark of how 
well a university is faring compared to others.  Due to problems with data availability, the use 
of difference values severely reduce our sample size by one-third, we chose not to present the 
results in here although we found that the change in real income derived from fees paid by 




The three ratio variables we use to estimate the effect of highly paid academics on VC pay are 
positively significant in the RE and OLS estimations.  Overall results show the number of 
highly paid academic staff does push up VC pay.  This finding is of considerable interest 
                                                 
28 Results are available on request from the authors.   20 
since it is compatible with elements of tournament theory.  The suggestion is that higher 
relative pay in the senior echelons of a university induces pressure for high pay of the VC at 
the institution.  This finding is consistent with competitive elements in a hierarchical 
organisation.  
 
Perhaps the most interesting result in this study in the positively significant effects of our 
institution performance variable. Average RAE score, that is the average RAE score per staff 
entered for assessment, represents the average departmental academic performance of an 
institution.  Results for the OLS  Institutional estimation and both the Institutional and 
Combined RE estimations show a positive relationship between academic performance and 
VC pay.  This result is important as it is one of the very few studies that report the importance 
of institutional performance on pay in the public sector. This result could be regarded as 
evidence of the increasing importance of the quasi-market and its functioning.  If this market 
is working efficiently then we would expect to find this result.  The fact that evidence from 
the public sector is rare increases the interest in this data and our findings. 
 
Although our estimated regressions are successful in explaining the variation in VC pay, what 
we have learned from the data still has limitations.  Our knowledge of the quality of the pay 
data is far from exhaustive.  Some institutions do not disclose information on pension 
contributions.  The other pecuniary benefits enjoyed by VCs are unreported, let alone the tax 
levied on them.  We also do not know whether the annual pay adjustment in each university is 
explicitly determined by performance-related remuneration schemes or via negotiation.  The 
situation is further clouded because some VCs have admitted to us that they would not risk 
taking large pay rise (which may be in line with their performance), for fear of inciting 
resentment from their staff.  It is potentially possible to explore the relationship between staff 
pay and the pay of the VC but data on this is limited.  The only statistics we have are the year 
on year percentage change of expenditure on academic staff salary by institution, but it does 
not reflect the true pay rise for staff as the rank and age of the faculties change every year.
29 
 
Lastly, we might expect that the organisation and governance structure of an institution could 
and should affect VC pay.  Given the diversity of institutions that are in the higher education   21 
sector, many of them have a less than conventional administrative structure that differ from, 
say, a Russell Group university.
30  Information on these aspects are again unavailable. 
 
7. Conclusion. 
We use a unique panel data set covering 8 years to study VC pay.  The data is distinct in that 
it contained detailed individual and institutional information over time.  This panel data 
enabled us to provide an explanation of the essential elements that determine VC pay and 
explain its variability.  The econometric results highlighted the importance of many personal 
and institutional factors in VC remuneration.  
 
Most importantly this article has found that VCs are remunerated more favourably for the 
academic research performance of the institutions they govern.  Hitherto there has been very 
little evidence of revealed performance elements being important in public sector pay – 
particularly of CEOs.  Hence our paper also provides some evidence of the functioning of the 
quasi-market in higher education, which is in turn important to understanding how the UK 
education system has evolved in the 1990s. 
 
We also find limited evidence of the internal hierarchical competitive elements in senior 
university pay, since those who govern universities with a large number of highly paid 
academics, are paid more.  This could provide efficient incentives to ensure a larger pool of 
potential competitors for VC posts in the future.  In turn this could lead to a more efficient 
functioning of this market which may, in turn, encourage higher ability people to apply for 
VC jobs.  This could only be good news for the UK university system. 
 
                                                                                                                                                          
29 Such values have been used in the estimations in Ehrenberg et. al. (2001). 
30 One of our discussants cautioned us on the great difference between the managerial structure of a university 
and that of a post-92 university.   22 
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Appendix:  Elements of Principal Components 
 
(principal factors; 4 factors retained) 
  Factor     Eigenvalue     Difference    Proportion    Cumulative 
------------------------------------------------------------------ 
     1        5.50383         4.53170      0.8504         0.8504 
     2        0.97213         0.84367      0.1502         1.0006 
     3        0.12846         0.08549      0.0198         1.0204 
     4        0.04297         0.06387      0.0066         1.0270 
     5       -0.02090         0.01614     -0.0032         1.0238 
     6       -0.03704         0.01819     -0.0057         1.0181 
     7       -0.05523         0.00662     -0.0085         1.0096 
     8       -0.06186               .     -0.0096         1.0000 
 
Factor Loadings 
    Variable |      1          2          3          4    Uniqueness 
-------------+----------------------------------------------------- 
Real Grants  |   0.97548   -0.07714    0.06773   -0.12380    0.0225 
Real Fees   |   0.91980   -0.18268   -0.12851    0.07799    0.0979 
Real Research|   0.74395    0.58285   -0.04824   -0.08471    0.09732 
Real Sundry  |   0.85811    0.37051    0.06195    0.06828    0.11787 
CostCentres  |   0.71440   -0.19112    0.21152    0.06476    0.40417 
Undergraduate|   0.78177   -0.57411    0.03729   -0.05567    0.05474 
Postgraduate |   0.84480   -0.14513   -0.22671    0.01891    0.21349 
Staff    |   0.76236    0.26195    0.06049    0.04555    0.34446 
 
. score f1 f2 f3 
            (based on unrotated factors) 
            (1 scoring not used) 
 
               Scoring Coefficients 
    Variable |      1          2          3 
-------------+-------------------------------- 
  realgrants |   0.51691    0.14494    1.12682 
    realfees |   0.20345   -0.09278   -0.68756 
  realrescon |   0.05544    0.50038   -0.61028 
 realsunfund |   0.15678    0.24430    0.42310 
    costcent |   0.01413   -0.01579    0.25135 
          ug |   0.03488   -0.85045   -0.16063 
          pg |   0.05321   -0.03276   -0.57405 
       staff |   0.04292    0.07873    0.08642 
 
 
  
 